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STATE OF UTAH 
INTERNATIONAL RESOURCES, 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
C. ROBERT DUNFIELD and 
LYNN S. DUNFIELD, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE; 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT; 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
This action was brought by Plaintiff, International 
Resources, to recover $6, 647.10 paid to Defendants as last and first 
month's rental on a Lease Agreement. Plaintiff was not allowed to 
occupy the building pursuant to the lease, and the Defendants have re-
fused to return the advance payment of $6, 647.10. The Court below 
granted a summary judgment of dismissal. From this summary judgment of 
dismissal, the Plaintiff appeals and seeks a reversal in order to litigate 
Lts cause of action on the merits. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On June 12, 1975, Snellen M. Johnson, claiming 
to be an assignee of the Plaintiff, filed a complaint against the Defen-
dants alleging that Plaintiff and Defendants had entered into a lease 
agreement by which Plaintiff paid to Defendants the amount of $6, 647.10 
for the first and last months of the lease period, and by which Defendants' 
agreed to provide certain premises for the occupancy of the Plaintiff. 
Johnson also alleged that Defendants failed to provide to Plaintiff the 
premises, and that Plaintiff was therefore entitled to a return of the 
$6, 647.10. Johnson also alleged that Plaintiff had assigned to him its 
cause of action against Defendants. 
2. After Johnson's complaint had been filed, the Defen-
dants moved the Court for an Order permitting the Defendants to add 
International Resources as a Plaintiff in the case. The Court granted 
the Defendants' motion. Defendants, however, did not obtain service of 
International Resources and no jurisdiction over International Resources 
was ever acquired. 
3. A trial was then held to litigate the merits of John-
son's cause of action. The minute entry of the trial states that Johnson 
put on his evidence, and after he put on his evidence, the Defendants the~ 
moved the Court to dismiss for failure to prove the allegations in the 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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complaint. The Court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss. The 
minute entry also shows that Johnson's counsel offered an Exhibit 
designated as 2-P, and specified as "Assignment," but that the Court 
refused to receive this evidence. 
4. After the trial of Johnson's cause of action, the 
attorney for Defendants submitted a document entitled "Order of Dis-
missal", which was then signed by the Honorable Bryant H. Croft. 
5. After Judge Croft had signed said Order of Dismissal, 
Johnson's counsel objected to the form of the Order, and moved the Court 
for a modification on the grounds that International Resources was never 
joined as a party; that the order should not run to a dismissal of preju-
dice as to International Resources. The Court granted Johnson's motion. 
The Court then signed a second Order of Dismissal submitted by Johnson's 
counsel. 
follows: 
6. The second Order of Dismissal states in part, as 
a. 11 ••• International Resources has never been 
formally advised that it had been joined as a party 
plaintiff in the above entitled action, nor no Summons 
nor Service of Process ever having been served on 
International Resources, International Resources is 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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dismissed from the case as a party plaintiff, and 
as a counterclaim defendant." 
b. "The n1atter thereupon went to trial 
. (and) 
the evidence was presented on behalf of the Defendant 
. Defendant made a motion to dismiss based.upon 
Plaintiff's failure to prove allegations as prayed for 
in the complaint ... (T)he complaint of the Plaintiff, 
Snellen M. Johnson, ... is hereby dismissed with 
prejudice . 
7. After the trial of Johnson's cause of action, the 
Court made no findings of fact, nor did it enter any conclusions of 
law. 
8. Subsequent to the entry of said second Order of 
Dismissal of Johnson's cause of action, Plaintiff, International 
Resources, then filed a complaint against the Defendants alleging 
that it was entitled to a return of said $6, 647.10 for breach of said 
lease agreement by Defendants. At this point, Defendants moved the 
Court for an Order dismissing the Plaintiff's complaint on the grounds 
that the issue had been previously litigated in Snellen Johnson versus 
Dunfield, Civil No. 228490. From that Order, the Plaintiff appeals. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 




THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA DOES NOT BAR 
PLAINTIFF FROM LITIGATING ITS CAUSE OF ACTION 
ON MERITS 
An examination of the above facts leads to the conclu-
s ion that the doctrine of res judicata should not bar Plaintiff's cause 
of action against Defendants merely because Defendants face a 
similar lawsuit from another Plaintiff. It is the general rule of 
law that res judicata cannot be applied against strangers to the prior 
action. Clark v. Wilson, (Ky) 316 SW 2d 693; Mays v. District Ct., 
34 Idaho 200, 200 P. 115; Morrissey v. Bologna, 240 Miss. 284, 123 So. 2d s:: 
cert. den. and app. dismd., 366 U.S. 212; O'Hara v. Pittston Co., 186 
Va. 325, 42 SE2d 269; Simmons v. Parrent, 71 Wyo. 207, 256 P2d 101. 
This rule is stated in 46 Arn. Jur. 2d Judgments 518, p. 670-671 as 
follows: 
It is also well settled that, with certain exceptions 
hereinafter noted, that the doctrine of res judicata 
does operate to effect strangers to a judgment, that 
is, to effect the rights of those who are neither parties nor 
in privity with a party therein, whether the judgment is 
attempted to be used in connection with the cause of action 
previously litigated, or connection with particular issues 
determined therein. This is particularly true where the 
doctrine of res judicata is sought to be applied as against 
strangers to the prior action, whether the stranger is a 
. I 
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plaintiff or a defendant in the latter action. It 
has also been applied regarldess of the fact that 
the stranger knew of the prior action and might 
have been intervened therein, or that he offered 
to become a party but was denied the privilecre 
or that he attempted to enjoin prosecution or°t~e 
prior action. 
In explicating this rule of law, the Supreme Court of 
Utah in Tanner vs. Bacon, 136 P. Zd 957, 959-60 (Utah, 1943), 
stated: 
It is well settled that the doctrine of res judicata does 
not operate to affect strangers toward a judgment; 
that it only affects the parties, and their successors 
in interest, and those who are in privity with a party 
thereto . . . This court has defined the word "privity" 
as "a mutual or successive relationship to the same 
right or property. As applied to judgments or decrees 
of courts, the word means one whose interests have 
been legally represented at the time. 11 
Also, the Supreme Court of Utah, in In re Town of 
West Jordan, Inc., 326 P. Zd 105, 107 (Utah, 1958) stated the 
following: 
in the ordinary case where a judgment has been 
granted on issues which have been litigated between 
the same parties, such issues under the doctrine of 
collateral estoppal cannot be relitigated in a subse-
quent but different cause of action . . . That doctrine 
only applies where a q,uestion of fact essential to and 
determinative of the judgment is actually litigated and 
determined by a valid or final judgment which is 
conclusive as between the parties to a subsequent 
action on a different cause of action. (Emphasis added.) 
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From the foregoing discussion of law, it is apparent 
that res judicata cannot possibly bar the Plaintiff from litigating its 
cause of action on the merits. This is because International Resources 
by order of the Court was dismissed from the previous lawsuit. The 
order of the Court specifically states that International Resources 
was dismissed as a party plaintiff and as a counter-claim defendant 
because service of process over International Resources was never 
effected. Thus, International Resources was not a party to the pre-
vious action, and therefore res judicata is not applicable. It should 
also be noted that the privity exception as defined by the Utah Supreme 
Court is not applicable to the instant case because there is no evidence 
in the record showing any type of privity between the Plaintiff and 
Snellen M. Johnson. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT IN THE PREVIOUS LAWSUIT FOUND THAT 
THERE HAD BEEN NO VALID ASSIGNMENT FROM PLAIN-
TIFF TO SNELLEN M. JOHNSON, AND THEREFORE 
PLAINTIFF CANNOT BE PRECLUDED FROM LITIGATING. 
ITS CAUSE OF ACTION ON THE MERITS 
The facts show that the previous court on the issue of 
assignment of the cause of action from the Plaintiff to Snellen M. 
Johnson found that there was no valid assignment. The Order of 
Dismissal, as well as the Minute Entry states that Johnson put 
on his evidence before the previous Court and then Defendants 
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moved to dismiss for failure to prove the allegations in the 
complaint, and that the Court granted the Motion to Dismiss. 
The Minute Entry also shows that an "Assignment" was offered 
by Johnson's counsel, but refused by the Court. One of Mr. 
Johnson's allegations was that there had been a valid assignment 
from International Resources to Snellen lv1. Johnson. If Mr. 
Johnson failed to prove this allegation, then the Court must have 
determined that there was no valid assignment. Also, it is appar-
ent that the Court found that there was no valid assignment because 
the supposed "Assignment". itself was refused by the Court. 46 Am. 
Jur. 2d. Judgments 508, p. 662 states a rule of law which is 
applicable to these facts: 
The general rule is that a judgment rendered because 
of a defect of parties does not operate to bar subse-
quent action. This rule prevails whether the judgment 
is based upon a want of parties, a misjointer of parties, 
a temporary disability of the plaintiff to sue or a mis-
take of the plaintiff as to the character or capacity in 
which he brings the suit. 
The instant situation fits squarely into this rule of law, which is an 
exception to the doctrine of res judicata. In the previous case, the 
Court found that there had been no valid assignment. Therefore, 
Johnson was under a disability to bring the cause of action in the first 
place. In other words, the rule of law is that if a cause of action 
does not belong to the party bringing suit, then the findings of fact 
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and judgment cannot possibly be res judicata against the proper 
party bringing suit. Obviously, Plaintiff is the proper party bring-
ing suit in the instant case, and the doctrine of res judicata is not 
applicable. 
It should also be noted that if the doctrine of res judi-
cata is a bar to the bringing of the cause of action by International 
Resources now, then it was also a bar to International Resources 
at the time of Johnson's trial. Thus, if the Court would have thought 
that International Resources was precluded from bringing another 
lawsuit, the Court would not have dismissed International Resources 
from the previous case, but would have determined that the judgment 
was conclusive as to International Resources. It should also be noted 
that the Court's dismissal of International Resources from the prior 
lawsuit, is perfectly consistent with the rest of the Order of Dismissal 
and the Minute Entry since the Order of Dismissal and the Minute 
Entry show that there had been no valid assignment. Thus, the 
Court had no choice but to dismiss International Resources from the 
case with the intention that it would be allowed to litigate its cause 
oi action in a subsequent lawsuit. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-10-
POINT III 
THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA BARS THE 
DEFENDANTS FROM RAISING THE ISSUE OF WHETHER 
THE PLAINTIFF MAY LITIGATE ITS CAUSE OF ACTION 
ON THE MERITS 
46 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments 518, p. 669 - 70 states: 
With regard to the persons as to whom the doctrine 
of res judicata is applicable, the rule is well settled 
that a judgment is binding in favor of or against all 
parties to the proceedings in which it is rendered, 
and their privies, whether the doctrine is asserted 
on behalf of the plaintiff, or defendant in a subsequent 
action. 
From this rule of law, it is apparent that the order of dismissal of 
Johnson's cause of action in the prior lawsuit, is beinding upon the 
Defendants since the Defendats were a party to the prior lawsuit. 
The order of dismissal specifically states that the Plaintiff was dis-
missed from the prior lawsuit for failure to obtain jurisdiction over 
the Plaintiff. Thus, the issue as to whether the Plaintiff may now 
litigate its cause of action on the merits was decided in a previous 
lawsuit in favor of the Plaintiff. Obvio;isly, the previous Court wouid 
not have dismissed International Resources from the lawsuit had it 
determined that International Resources was precluded from litigating 
its cause of action in another lawsuit. In short, Defendants are now 
barred by the doctrine of res judicata from relitigating an issue previoi' 
ly decided by a court of law. 
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POINT IV 
DEFENDANTS ARE ESTOPPED FROM ASSERTING 
THE DEFENSE OF RES JUDICATA 
The Order of Dismissal of Johnson's cause of action 
in the prior lawsuit states that International Resources was dis-
missed because of the fact that service of process had never been 
effected. The failure to join International Resources, therefore, 
was the fault of the Defendants. Obviously, if Defendants had 
served International Resources with process, International Resources 
would have been brought into the case, and the judgment of the Court 
would have been res judicata against International Resources pre-
eluding it from bringing another lawsuit against the Defendai ts. 
Defendants, therefore, should not now be allowed to assert the defense 
of res judicata since it was their fault and not the fault of anyone else 
that International Resources was never brought into the case. In 
short, Defendants should be estopped from asserting the defense of 
res judicata. 
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CONCLUSION 
The summary dissmissal of the Plaintiff's cause of action 
was not consistent with the law and facts. The Judgment 
of dismissal should be reversed. 
R~;ua: 
Lorin N. Pace ~ 
Attorney at Law 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
431 South 3rd East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
I certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing brief of 
appellant to Steven C. Vanderlinden, 137 East State Street 
Farmington, Utah 84025, Attorney for Defendant, postage 
- pewpaid, this 8th day of January, 1979. 
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